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Tin Mining in the Valley of Heaven
I remember the beauties of the Valley of Heaven as
though it were yesterday, still the difficulties
that befell us there made me at that time regard
it as the Valley of Hell."
0. O'Neil, 1921.
Immediately to the south of the Swaziland capital of Mbabane lie the
Malegwane Hill and, at its feet, the Ezulwini Valley, geographical
heartland of the powerful nineteenth century Swazi state under the
military kings Sobhu2a I and Mswati (Bonner, 1983) . The sacred places
of Swazi lore and the royal villages of successive Swazi kings and
queens dot the valley and the flanking granite outcrops of the Mdimba
Hills to the east. It was to one of these villages, Embekelweni, that
two Scots mining prospectors came in 1874 and acquired the first of over
fifty mineral concessions eventually granted by the Swazi king Mbandeni.
The concessions covered the entire country but only a handful were ever
profitably worked. Several of these were in the Ezulwini Valley itself.
Today the Valley is cluttered with the debris of a century of capitalist
penetration; canneries, casinos, campgrounds, cotton fields and much
more besides jostle one another for space on the increasingly crowded
valley floor. Possibly the most unsightly landscape markers of all are
the bright red slashes of gully erosion which punctuate the base of the
Lupohlo and Mantenga Hills on the west side of the valley. These scars
stand as silent testimony to an all but forgotten phase in the life of
the area and to a vibrant history of struggle on the valley floor. Here
(and in several localities around the town of Mbabane itself)
cassiterite tin was regularly mined between 1894 and 1948.
This paper is part of a larger effort to recover the shrouded history of
the Swaziland mining industry locked up in relict landscapes, archival
records and the memories of Swazi workers and peasants. The bigger
project will encompass the better-known, though equally unresearched,
mining of asbestos at Havelock and iron ore at Ngwenya (which like the
tin industry before it, is now defunct). To date my attention has
focussed on documentary sources for the period before 1920 and the light
which their study can bring to the veiled history of tin mining in the
Valley of Heaven.
Recent studies of mining and migrancy in southern Africa have tended to
focus upon large-scale, labour-intensive gold, copper and diamond
production in the core industrial areas of the sub-continent; in
particular the Witwatersrand, Kimberley and the Zambian copperbelt
(Johnstone, 1976; Perrings, 1979; Lacey, 1981; Levy, 1982; Parpart,
1985; Jeeves, 1985). Much less attention has been paid to the nature
and impact of local mining operations in the rural periphery (although
see Van Onselen, 1976; Shapiro, 1985). This situation is regrettable
since the history of such operations shows up some of the essential
weaknesses of capitalism in colonial Africa and the particular
difficulties facing colonial capitalist enterprise plunged into an
agrarian setting. Despite its proximity to a potentially voluminous
labour supply, peripheral mining faced continuous problems in securing
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sufficient labour, and in holding and controlling the labour which it
did acquire. The absence of any marked spatial separation between
centres of capitalist production and the rural homesteads of the mine
workforce, so characteristic of migrant labour systems in general,
therefore impinged directly on the production and profitability of
peripheral mining. Thus even when capital went to labour (rather than
the more pervasive opposite scenario) its problems with worker control
were far from resolved. Indeed, the juxtaposition of capitalist
enterprise and peasant economy tended, if anything, to intensify the
conflict between labour and capital on the mines, particularly over the
use and disposition of time.
In colonial southern Africa, the dependence of many rural homesteads on
migrant labour and peasant production meant that conflicts over the
issue of capitalist time-thrift were particularly enduring and intense.
Indeed, some recent studies have demonstrated that such conflicts tended
to intensify over time despite the erosion of the rural productive base
(Beinart, 1982; Crush, 1987). In order to capture the time-space paths
of a migrant working class still rooted in peasant economy, capital and
the colonial state resorted to a battery of coercive controls (Cooper,
1984). These included rigorous enforcement of work-discipline at the
point of production; a battery of extra-economic and legal constraints
on migrant behaviour; attempts to manipulate social and economic
conditions in the rural supplier areas; and the use of various
incentives to alter the periodicity and timing of migrancy (Crush,
Jeeves and Yudelman, forthcoming).
As this paper suggests, however, all of these methods were much less
successful when there was no substantial distancing of capitalist
workplace and rural homestead. In 1937, an irate petition from settlers
in Swaziland complained that "when the native is on the (Johannesburg)
mines he cannot leave whenever it suits him" but in Swaziland itself
"the native is near his home and is continually absenting himself to
attend to his own affairs, crops, illness at his kraal, beer drinks, or
anything else that turns up. He is working off a dead horse and is
inclined to spin out the time as much as he can." This sort of pattern
was not unusual in peripheral mining operations in the region at large.
What made the Swazi case distinctive was the perpetuation of strong
links between Swazi commoners and the Swazi ruling class in the
countryside. In Swaziland, in addition to recurrent homestead
obligations, miners remained enmeshed in a web of demands by local
figures of authority which impinged directly upon their labour market
behaviour. Attempts by the mines to resolve these problems by relying
on labour from further afield were not without their contradictions
either.
Cassiterite tin was first located in Swaziland in the early 1890s. The
tin was largely concentrated in an eighty-mile long belt of alluvial
gravels which stretched from Oshoek on the Transvaal border in a south-
easterly direction to the Mhlatuzane River, where it disappeared beneath
the Karoo sediments (Hall, 1913; Scott, 1950). Accessible deposits of
tin occurred throughout this zone and in the later years of the industry
tin was mined as far south as Kabuta. The bulk of the payable deposits
were located around Mbabane and to the west side of the Ezulwini Valley
where the over-burden was sufficiently penetrable and the water
resources were abundant enough to allow access to the tin-rich gravels
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below. To the north-west of Mbabane tin lodes did occur in situ in
pegmatite veins but it was only at Forbes Reef, and that for a very
brief period, that anything other than alluvial mining occurred in
Swaziland.
During its sixty year existence the tin mining industry experienced
rapid and dramatic changes in fortune. The quantity of tin dressed and
the revenue derived from its export fluctuated sharply from year to year
(Figure 2.) Foreign capitalists and investors had a continual love-hate
relationship with the Swazi tin fields, never being prepared to
subscribe sufficient capital yet always the first to complain when
profits failed to meet expectations. As early as 1892 the Witwatersrand
magnate Lionel Phillips recorded his penchant for Swazi tin on the
grounds that "it won't involve a big outlay and may be very
profitable". He was proved right on the first score but not on the
second. As a result, companies and syndicates were constantly being
floated, liquidated and resuscitated.
In the 1890s little or no profitable tin mining took place. Concessions
over tin-bearing land were held by a number of small syndicates who
extracted the metal in a desultory, wasteful and haphazard manner, using
tribute miners. The most important of the companies was the Ryan Tin
Syndicate which raised approximately 500 tons of dressed tin in the
1890s. In 1892 the Swazi Resident Advisor, Offy Shepstone, persuaded a
reluctant group of Rand mining capitalists that tin was "the best and
only chance of making something out of Swaziland." Capital was
subscribed and the Ryan Syndicate acquired title to seven concessions
covering an area of 50 000 acres in the Mbabane and Ezulwini areas.
The Ryan Syndicate staggered along for six years, alternating between
tribute mining and direct production. The success of the tributors was
mixed. Most obtained sizable advances from the company and eventually
left the country heavily in debt. Only one, an Australian named Foy
with previous experience in tin, made a living. In 1899 the Syndicate
was forced to liquidate its assets, a victim of high transport costs,
inexperienced management, labour and capital shortages, and political
uncertainty. The plant that remained was smashed and looted during the
South African War. Between 1899 and 1905 there was no mining whatever
(Fawns, 1905) . In 1906 world tin prices rose above £200 a ton and
Swaziland tin became a viable proposition. By 1911 five tin properties
were being worked. Between 1905 and 1920 cassiterite tin constituted
over 50% of Swaziland's exports by value. The success of the industry
was consequently a major item on the agenda of the impoverished British
colonial administration in the country. In the partition of land
between Swazi and foreign interests in 1908, for example, great pains
were taken to excise the tin mines from the reserves. In 1911, colonial
officials colluded in a cover-up with mine management over an
investigation into unsafe working conditions at one of the major mines.
Before the 1920s the main tin producer was Swaziland Tin Limited (with
70-90% of total output in the 1910s) which went into production in 1905
after a takeover by the Rand mining house, H. Eckstein & Company.
Other mining houses acquired interests in Swazi tin but these properties
showed much less promise and were worked on a tribute basis by
individual white miners or small syndicates such as Polongeni Tins,
Usutu Tin and McCreedy Tins.
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The best years for the industry were between 1910 and 1920 when high
prices of over £300 a ton stimulated the production of-several thousand
tons of dressed tin with a market value of over £200. Thereafter the
industry went into slow decline discouraged by the 1920s crash, high
costs and the gradual exhaustion of payable reserves. In the mid-1920s
and again in the mid-1930s there was fleeting respite. In the late
1920s, South African capitalists withdrew their support and most of the
companies were sold off to local white settlers. Small-scale
operations, employing between 500 - 1 000 workers at any one time,
continued into the late 1940s.
The profitability of the tin mines was continually compromised by four
factors: high transportation costs; the labour-intensive nature of tin
mining; the cost of reproducing the workforce; and the work behaviour
of the miners themselves. Before the 1920s the bulk of the tin ore was
exported via the port of Lourenco Marques in neighbouring Mozambique.
Without the benefit of a direct rail link all transport to the nearest
railhead had to be undertaken in ox-drawn wagons; a costly, difficult
and time-consuming venture. Some sense of the problem can be gleaned
from a contemporary description of this mode of transportation in
Swaziland:
Next morning we started down the steep slopes of
the valley. This was a very dangerous descent for
the wagons, so that it was after mid-day before
we reached the floor of the valley . . . our energy
was sapped, the animals were worn out, and our
boys were lazy beyond all use. The trail ahead
consisted of low hills cut by little streams.
Many of the inclines were steep and I estimated
that we would by lucky if we made five or six
miles a day ... we did most of our travelling by
dark. This helped a little, but we failed to make
more than a mile every two hours, even when the
going was good.
(O'Neil, 1921 : 262-3)
The lack of rail transport kept the coal mines of Swaziland out of
production completely. The Swazi Coal Mines Limited, whose major
shareholder was H. Eckstein & Company, had mined over 2 000 tons of coal
at their lowveld property east of Bremersdorp in the 1890s. The coal
sat at the pithead for many years after the South African War, and was
gradually sold off to Swazi homesteads for domestic use. Eckstein•s
advanced enough money for the upkeep of the property but not enough to
put the mine into production, because transport facilities were so
rudimentary. The tin (and local gold) producers were more successful in
overcoming the transport constraint, because of the high tin prices and
the relative proximity of the northern gold mines to a railhead.
Nevertheless, transport costs bit deeply into potential profits and kept
wages low. This was true for individual tributors and small syndicates
with limited capital as well as major Rand mining houses who did not
want to lose money on peripheral properties. In 1928, the South African
Railways established a bus freight service linking the tin mines with
the eastern Transvaal railhead of Breyten but by then most of the profit
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bearing tin had already been mined. In the 1930s and 1940s Swazi tin
was sold on a depressed South African market.
The companies used two methods of raising tin. The first was the
tribute (or colloquially styled "cheaper-than-chinaman11) system where
white tributors recruited and employed their own gangs of 10 to 20 black
workers on each creek. The tributors were paid £33 per ton of dressed
tin in 1907 but this method was abandoned soon thereafter since
productivity was low, methods inefficient and labour recalcitrant.
Under the second, and favoured method, the companies engaged gangs of
20-40 labourers themselves to remove the over-burden and sluice the rich
tin-bearing gravels at the bottom of creeks. Each gang had its own
black nduna and a white overseer was put in charge of several gangs.
Suggestions to do away with the overseers and to concentrate larger
labour gangs do not appear to have been followed through. Proposals to
use Swazi families as tribute miners were not implemented either. The
alluvial nature of the tin deposits and the sluicing method of
recovering tin ore called for a labour intensive operation. A network
of drainage furrows, some up to 20 kms in length, had to be dug in order
to tap and channel the headwaters of the area's drainage systems. Then
the overburden had to be broken up (which varied in thickness from 2 to
20 metres), the gravel shovelled into sluice boxes, and the cassiterite
removed after sluicing. In 1911 the companies made an important
technological innovation when hydraulic monitors were introduced from
Malaysia to break up the overburden. Labour demand slackened,
productivity and output increased and the cost of recovering cassiterite
fell by 40 per cent.
During the early years of the industry, the tin mines were regularly
short-staffed. Swazi participation in wage employment of any kind was
desultory and sporadic before the second decade of this century. For
those Swazi homesteads who did release labour, the low wages and poor
conditions on the local mines were unattractive. Wages were far below
those on offer at various South African centres and living conditions
were particularly squalid. Rations v/ere meagre and unattractive. One
reason for this was that the mines were unable to secure a regular and
sufficient quality of maize from local producers. White farmers were
having their own difficulties with labour and proved unable to sell
maize at a competitive price. Few Swazi homesteads were willing or able
to supply maize to the mines. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, Swazi
agriculture was in deep crisis during the first two decades of the
century and many homesteads were themselves becoming dependent on
imported maize. The local mines were forced to import from trading
firms in the pastern Transvaal who were never averse to a little
price-gouging. To compensate for the high costs, and to recapture a
portion of the mine wage, the companies established small stores on the
mine properties where miners could supplement their poor diet with
meat, sugar and vegetables. Local mine managers spoke repeatedly of
the difficulties and gloomy prospects for the industry:
We have had frequent experience of the scarcity of
unskilled labour available even for the modest
requirements of the present ... It seems very
curious but it's a fact and if tomorrow we
required 1 000 or even 500 unskilled labourers we
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would be at a loss to find them - locally at any
rate . . . The authorities are entirely sympathetic
but unfortunately under present conditions they,
like the employers, are helpless for the remedy
lies with the Swazi himself.
Even when one of the local mines raised its wages, the impact was
minimal; in 1906, one mine was unable to increase its labour complement
from 250 to 550 by temporarily doubling wages. Although mine managers
appealed to the local administration for assistance in meeting their
labour needs, the state had limited powers in directing labour their
way.
In late 1906, the mine managers presented a strong case to the High
Commissioner that without firmer state assistance the industry would
collapse. Selborne immediately declared open support for the local
mines although he did not abandon the state's overarching commitment to
the South African labour market. In an address to the Swazi people in
Mbabane he urged that:
All those men who can work ought to go and work
for it is necessary for their prosperity and that
of the country that they should do so.
Particularly do I wish the Paramount Chief and the
chiefs to see that of those young men who seek
work, a sufficient number should seek work in the
mines and industries of Swaziland. It is well for
Swaziland that many Swazis should go and seek work
in the Transvaal, but it is bad for Swaziland that
so few should seek work in Swaziland itself.
Selborne wanted the local mines to prosper, because the colonial state
gained revenue through taxation on mining profits, and he wanted local
labour in the mines, because capital was being drained from the country
through foreign migrants' wages. Given the inability of the state to
move Swazi labour to the Rand it seemed logical that they should work
locally and buttress the revenue-starved administration.
Unable to secure sufficient labour locally, the mines were forced to
rely on imported Mozambican labour, thus reinforcing a pattern which had
emerged in the late 1890s. At that time the majority of workers in a
small mine labour force of under 2 000 were Mozambicans. The footpaths
of Swaziland were worn smooth by these migrants who transformed the
mines of the country into "a halting if not a kindergarten for boys
travelling Randwards" by stopping no longer than a month or two. On
their return journey many more Mozambicans made a detour through
Swaziland to buy cattle. The country acquired a reputation as the
"stockyard" of southern Africa in the years before rinderpest as Swazis
disposed of large numbers of cattle to white and black buyers: "several
thousands must be expended annually by Tonga and Portuguese natives,
who, returning from the goldfields, elect to invest their money in Swazi
stock and pay good prices too, for their acquisitiveness". The
investment of mine wages in Swazi cattle by miners was probably one way
of circumventing the restrictive conditions governing marriage
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transactions in southern Mozambique, of which Patrick Harries has
written.
The resuscitation of the Swaziland mines in the first decade of British
rule again drew Mozambican migrants going to the Witwatersrand, though
not now on the return journey. Swazi herds were decimated by rinderpest
and East Coast Fever between 1898 and 1905 and few homesteads were able
or willing to part with stock. It is not clear exactly how many
Mozarnbicans passed through Swaziland, but several hundred (663 in 1908-9
and 462 in 1909-10) took out travelling passes every year. It is likely
that this was to legitimise a rather longer stay than the two or three
days it took to cross the country on foot, or to acquire an advance
from labour agents recruiting in Swaziland for the Rand gold mines.
Given the prevailing Swazi attitude towards local minework, the mine
companies were aware that despite the advantages of location, they would
have to battle to secure a share of the small migrant labour force.
This was a major contradiction for Rand mining houses considering
investment in peripheral mines. By obtaining migrants for their major
mines there was always the chance that the labour supply of their
peripheral operations would suffer. Local mine managers were often left
with the uphill task of securing and stabilising their own labour
supply. With the Swazi who would not work and with those who left the
country independently of recruiters, very little could be done. But
when the labour supply was challenged directly by recruiters, the
response was swift and forthright. In mid-1906 a band of labour touts
entered Swaziland in search of labour for construction of the Carolina-
Ermelo railway extension and attempted to recruit on the Swaziland Tin
property. The offer of £3 per month had the predictable effect of
"unsettling the Company's boys" when compared with their own wages of
less than 30 shillings per month. The company responded by temporarily
raising the wages of their longer-serving employees and "arranging much
information to be circulated to the detriment of the Railway works".
In pursuit of Swazi labour, the mines hired recruiters, who then had
considerable difficulty finding recruits. Swaziland Tin appointed four
white recruiters and a number of black runners under one Albert Mabaso
in 1906. The white recruiters managed to obtain only 29 recruits in
the eighteen-month period from July 1906 to December 1907. The most
successful black runner, Kaptain, recruited 51 labourers in the same
period but the other runners - Miner, Longone, Solomon, Skakaza,
Majack, Sixpence and Carriage - only managed 51 between them. The
lack of success of the recruiters and runners led the mine manager,
Sydney Ryan, to try to work through the Swazi rulers, in the belief that
this was the only sure way to obtain the required labour. Ryan went
directly to the Swazi capital where he was permitted to address a
general meeting of the Swazi council of chiefs on the labour needs of
the company. Later he met privately with the Queen Regent and Prince
Malunge and "interested them, by means of presents and promises of a
capitation fee, in getting the young men of the Nation to work at the
mines". Ryan was confident that the labour problems of the company
were at an end when he concluded an agreement with Prince Malunge in
September 1906 for the supply of 500 labourers at a capitation fee of
ten shillings each.
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Malunge also agreed "not to divert or supply labour to other companies
or individuals without first submitting such labour to the Swaziland
Tin Company". His confidence that he could get the labour was
short-lived. In the following months he supplied a mere 30 workers
(most probably from his own personal following) for whi ~h he received a
modest payment of £20.
Ryan was certainly not the first or the last recruiter to try and
mobilise Swazi labour by working through members of the Swazi
aristocracy. There is evidence of at least six such contracts with
different recruiters between 1899 and 1910. In 1899, for example, with
the collusion of the local Republican state, Bunu signed an extensive
agreement with a Boer trader and recruiter from Ermelo, Thuys Grobler,
who was later somewhat improbably titled "the White King of Swaziland"
by Owen O'Neil. The contract gave Grobler the exclusive right to
recruit labour in Swaziland while Bunu undertook to supply on demand
"within fourteen days as many sound, healthy Swazis apparently between
the ages of 17 and 45 years as possible (in no case less than 50 on each
demand) in exchange for a fee of 10 shillings per head". In 1903,
WNLA struck up an agreement with the Swazi Queen Regent in which she was
to "teach" Swazi men the value of signing on with the organisation. For
a brief period she became a salaried employee of WNLA who paid her £30
per month for her services. In 1907, a year after Ryan's deal with
Prince Malunge, two advisers of the Swazi Queen Regent, Josiah Vilikazi
and Albert Bremer, concluded a secretive agreement with the Labour
Department of the Robinson Group to supply 500 Swazis for the mines.
And in 1910, a trading firm, the South African Merchants Corporation
Limited, who had acquired the Bunu-Grobler contract of 1899, informed
the Swaziland Resident Commissioner that "no-one but this Corporation
can recuirt labour in Swaziland for work in as much as we claim that all
other recruiting is illegal. It is our intention to mat the necessary
legal machinery into motion to stop that recruiting". It was at that
point, following a decade of indecision, that the colonial
administration implemented legislation barring agreements between chiefs
and recruiters in the country.
In late 1908 an extraordinary contract was signed by Queen Regent
Labotsibeni and a recruiter from the York Mine in Krugersdorp, Bonnar
Armstrong, earlier sacked by the colonial service in Matabeleland.
There is considerable surviving information about this agreement and I
have considered its ramifications in detail elsewhere (Crush, 1987), In
short, however, it serves to tie together all the various recruiting
deals since it reveals much about the underlying motivations of the
various parties involved, and provides a strong indication of why they
failed. At Armstrong's instigation the Queen Regent called together
several regimental groups and dispatched them to Krugersdorp very much
as if they were proceeding to war- These groups of soldiers were
instructed to "spy out the Rand as a workshop for the Nation", as a
precursor to a massive mobilisation of Swazi regimental labour for the
wage labour market under centralised aristocratic control, (see
appendix). The agreement with Armstrong, together with the various
other contracts, are consistent with what was known at the time as the
"one gate" policy of the Queen Regent; an attempt by the Dlamini rulers
to exercise control over migrant labout and the fruits of wage labour.
In addition, any uncontrolled migrant movement threatened the existence
of the centralising institutions of Swazi society such as the regimental
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(emabutfo) system. It was this particular institution, so central to
Dlamini dominance in the nineteenth century, which the aristocracy
struggled to retain, manipulate, and adapt in the twentieth. Plans to
legitimise wage labour in the industrial army of the region as a
suitable regimental activity and to exercise central control over the
migrant labour flow, were furthered by a frustrated band of recruiters
who had calculated that their path to the labour resources of the
country lay in the regiments.
Swaziland Tin's Sydney Ryan failed to gain a great deal from his
agreement with the aristocracy; but nor did any of the other contracts
provide evidence of any ability on the part of the aristocracy to
mobilise regimental labour for wage work. Armstrong•s York Mine
regiments either returned early, deserted before leaving Swaziland, or
in one case, waited until they got to Johannesburg before heading off to
work on different mines. As The Times of Swaziland commented, not
without a hint of irony, "the peaceful conquest of the Transvaal by
Swazi impis is indefinitely delayed". In part the Regent's whole
strategy failed because it was actively contested by regional chiefs in
outlying districts, but its failure can also be laid at the door of
resistance by migrants to central directives concerning the conditions
and locations of employment, as the testimony of one worker makes clear:
When I left the Chief's kraal about two weeks ago
a messenger from the Queen Regent was there,
having come to call out a gang of forced labour by
the Queen's order. A large number of natives were
assembled, and the messenger said: "The Queen
requires all the members of the 'Halaza', 'Gavu',
'Ngulube• and 'Mgadhlela' regiments to go to her
kraal to be sent ... for mining work, as the
others who were sent are about to finish their
Time." The messenger questioned the Chief as to
the reason why he had not sent natives when
previously ordered by the Queen, and the Chief
replied that he had no men to send. The old men
spoke, stating that if the Queen was going to
imprison them and their chief, the young men had
better go to work . . . the young men then said to
the chief - "As you are arrested on our account
we will go in compliance with the Queen's order"
. . . the natives belonging to my tribe are most
unwilling to go ... and will only comply out of
fear that their Chief will be punished or killed
by the Queen.
With tension mounting in the countryside, the colonial state was forced
to intervene to defuse the situation. Colonial legislation constituted
the final blow, not only to the recruiters' bid for regimental labour,
but to the Swazi aristocracy's policy of control.
Between 1907 and 1910, the Swaziland tin mines had fleeting respite as
local labour became more abundant.
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The coercive methods adopted by the colonial state in mid-1907 to smash
general Swazi aversion to wage employment, and the mobilisation of
labour by local chiefs later the same year, heralded a brief change in
fortune for the local mines (Crush, 1985). In the President's address
to the Swaziland Chamber in August 1907, a new note of optimism was
sounded: "the main handicap during the year was lack of native labour
but the past three months have shown a marked improvement in this
respect and the forces which have operated to bring about a change not
the least of which is the sympathetic attitude of the Administration and
the amenability of the native to tactful control. One mining company
that could barely keep 400 natives as the standard of its labour role
has now 1 000 native employees on its books". Numerous Swazi men in
the centre and north of the country began to turn up for work on the
local mines. The "sympathetic attitude" of the administration, to which
the President made reference, included a decision not to prosecute tax
defaulters at work on the mines. Mine managers later began to advance
tax money to defaulters as a means of procuring their services.
The improvement in the labour situation at the local mines is
graphically illustrated by the case of Swaziland Tin which was able to
dispense with its recruiting operations altogether (Table 1). The
monthly average of black workers on the local mines jumped from under
600 in 1906 to 1 087 in 1907-8, and continued to rise steadily to 1 563
in 1908-9, 2 017 in 1909-10 and 2 897 in 1911-12.
Table 1: Workers Engaged by Swaziland Tin Limited, Monthly, 1906-8
Month
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
1906
Number
53
32
48
124
116
123
Recruits
1
-
1
14
26
34
1907
Number
71
57
101
150
162
182
210
166
195
206
237
187
Recruits
5
-
10
14
-
8
12
6
9
11
3
5
1908
Number Recruits
128
166
245
224
- -
- -
-
_
- -
- -
- -
Sources: SA, RCS 1OO|15, Heard to Swaziland Tin Limited,
24 September 1914; and Mine Officer to Head Office, 23
January 1915.
Competition with South African employers over Swazi labour intensified
again after 1910. In 1911, in an uncanny echo of the period before
1907, the mining industry reported that its most serious handicap was
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the shortage of labour. The causes were now somewhat different.
Earlier, Swazi aversion to local mine conditions had led to labour
shortages; in 1911, however, a "battalion of labour recruiters invaded
and disorganised the local supply". Appeals for colonial assistance
were again sympathetically received. The colonial state was committed
to the view that "it is only just that persons exploiting minerals in
the country should have first claim on the adjacent labour available",
and legislation was passecL to bar recruiters and their Swazi runners
from the mining properties. Nevertheless, the local mines were forced
to resurrect their recruiting operations.
While recurrent labour shortages provided a continual challenge for tin
mining capital, the "quality" of the labour they did obtain was far
below expectations. The major problem was an extremely high labour
turnover. In 1912, for example, the tin mines were forced to engage
over 9 000 men to sustain an average annual workforce of less than
2 400. One reason for this rapid turnover was the Mozambican miner.
These migrants stayed no longer than a few weeks in Swaziland on their
way to the Rand. Swazi workers forced into the workplace simply to
acquire money for food purchases or to make tax payments also avoided
extended periods in wage employment. Swazi workers on three or four
month oral contracts usually spread the contract over a longer neriod,
working sporadically and "returning when they feel inclined to".
Periods away from work were highly seasonal as workers responded to the
call of their homesteads to work in the fields. The mines consequently
experienced particularly acute labour shortages at times of ploughing,
planting and harvest. At such periods tin miners would only work for
two or three days^in the month leaving mine production "at the mercy of
their labourers".
In early 1910 the mine managers attempted to tackle the problem by
bringing the Masters and Servants Law to bear on a Swazi worker in a
test case. Despite Resident Commissioner Coryndon's firm support for
the move, it was rejected in court. Swazi workers quickly heard of the
decision and there was an immediate upsurge in desertions. The
companies appealed to the colonial state for less ambiguous legislation.
While colonial officials were very sympathetic, and even drafted anti-
desertion legislation, they realised that the signing and registration
of contracts was a necessary prerequisite for the enforcement of any
law. Local mine managers were aware that any attempts to enforce
written contracts on Swazi workers would be totally counterproductive
and took the line of least resistance, preferring a labour force prone
to "continual desertion" over none at all.
The leverage of tin workers, together with the ever-present cost
contraint, prevented the tin mines from using more rigorous institutions
of worker control which worked so well in Kimberley and on the Rand
(Moodie, 1983; Mabin, 1986). In contrast to the regimented, barrack-
like compounds in those centres, Swazi tin workers were simply housed in
camps of ramshackle, corrugated-iron huts with minimal service and
sanitation, thrown hastily together on the mine properties. As Kuper
later observed:
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"Native tin mine workers are regarded as temporary
and unskilled. They are paid weekly at the rate
of 8d to 2s per day, plus rations. The
'compounds' consist of crude huts built by the
men, and each hut is shared by two to six workers.
There are no proper sanitary arrangements:
periodically, however, the huts are shifted.
Supervision of living conditions is almost non-
existent .
(Kuper, 1947 : 12)
Mine managers did what they could to raise worker productivity. In 1908,
the new manager of Swaziland Tin, W. Knight, was commended by his
superiors as someone who could "teach a good deal to our Managers on the
Rand as to the organisation of coloured labour." Knight segregated
the workforce on ethnic lines and appointed ndunas who were of the same
ethnic background as their gangs. Wherever possible ndunas were also
the sons of chiefs. Knight later went to Potgietersrus to advise on the
labour problems of the tin mines there. The various alluvial creeks
of the tin properties were spread over a large area which made
continuous supervision of workers difficult. The companies consequently
depended heavily on their ndunas to enforce work discipline, a risky
enterprise. As Allister Miller cuttingly observed of the work behaviour
of tin miners: "the native in no sense performs a day's duty".
The lack of compound facilities inhibited the mechanisms of social
control needed to manipulate an essentially undisciplined work force.
The use of alcohol as a strategy of control in southern Africa has been
well documented (Van Onselen, 1982; Baker, 1987). Initially, in
Swaziland, mine workers tended to purchase beer from Swazi brewers since
"all the large Kraals around cater for (the miners) on Sunday, making
pots of beer and having dances". The Transvaal Liquor Licensing
Ordinance, in force in Swaziland, prohibited the manufacture of sorghum
beer for sale and its implementation tended to push Swazi brewers
farther away from the mines where arrest and prosecution were less
likely. Yet these actions had a negative effect on work discipline
since "bodies of natives working on Mines go great distances to obtain
kaf f ir beer and they are, at the beginning of the week, through
excessive drinking and fatigue, unable to work in a proper manner".
Finally, in 1913, after repeated appeals from the mining companies the
colonial state gave them permission to brew beer and distribute it to
employees at the end of a shift. One mine manager later recalled the
results:
Some years ago I brewed beer in my compound and
gave it to the boys once a week; but I found
instead of coming back on the Monday morning, they
finished my beer and went off to their women-folk
miles away and did not return until the
Wednesday.
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The administration was largely unsuccessful in its campaign to outlaw
the sale of beer. As early as September 1906, Selborne warned that he
was displeased to hear that because of excessive drinking miners were
sometimes unable to work for several days in the week and that if they
failed to "cure the evil for themselves11 he would legislate against the
drinkers.
Kuper's description of the situation in the 1930s suggests that colonial
threats remained just that:
Every week, especially on Monday mornings, a
number of workers are absent as a result of
excessive drinking; fights, usually over women,
are frequent. Women from the neighbourhood do a
profitable business in the sale of beer to mine
workers, and the compounds are recognised as
centres of drunkeness and immorality. Some of the
workers, who have their homes and gardens close
by, do not stay in the "compound". Because the
mines are either in or near to Native Areas the
labourers participate to a certain extent in the
traditional culture - they perform occasional
tribute for neighbouring chiefs and take part in
local discussions and ceremonies.
This sort of pattern was not unusual in peripheral mining operations.
What made the Swazi case distinctive was the resiliency of chief-
commoner relations in the countryside. The mines were close to the
royal villages and the homesteads of several important chiefs. (Figure
3.) That miners remained tied by a web of obligations to local figures
of authority impinged directly upon the degree and timing of their
participation in wage labour. There was little problem where an
agreement existed between the chief and commoners that the commoners
would migrate for employment, but when the chiefs demanded tribute
labour, the working period was constrained or interrupted. The chiefs
regularly called their followers to Umemo (tribute labour) or to
organised hunts, particularly on weekends. Indeed, it seems likely that
the demands on local miners actually increased with so many of their
confreres out of the country working. Mining operations were
continually disrupted by such demands. At the conclusion of these
activities there was usually a beer party, so that the workers returned
to the mines in a rather different state than that demanded by
capitalist enterprise.
Tension between the local mines and the chiefs was exacerbated by the
proximity of the royal villages. The Queen Regent even advised workers
on labour relations. In July 1908, in order to facilitate collections
for the campaign against colonial land policy, she ordered mine workers
to strike for higher wages. More typically, Swazi miners were called
upon to perform agricultural and other tasks at the royal villages. In
1907, for example, workers on the tin mines in the Ezulwini Valley and
at the gold mines at Forbes Reef were ordered to Zombode to assist in
building cattle byres on Sundays for the Queen Regent. The mine
managers responded to these weekend calls by introducing a system of
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Sunday labour to raise ailing productivity and to thwart the demands of
the chiefs and aristocracy. In 1912, the administration declared that
Sunday minework would not be permitted, bu± proceeded to turn a blind
eye to a practice which continued unabated. In 1916, disgruntled
mineworkers informed proselytizing missionaries to "go and preach to the
white men and tell them not to make us work on a Sunday".
In response to the other problems of labour control, the state was quick
to introduce some vigorous legislation. Clause 22 of the Native Labour
Regulation (Swaziland) Proclamation of 1913 noted that "any native
labourer in Swaziland who (a) neglects to perform any work which it is
his duty to perform; (b) unfits himself for the proper performance of
his work by having become or being intoxicated during working hours;
(c) refuses to obey any lawful command of his employer or any person
lawfully placed in authority over him; (d) uses any insulting or
abusive language to his employer or any person lawfully placed in
authority over him; or (e) commits any breach of any rules prescribed
for good order and discipline or health on any mine or works" would be
liable on conviction for a fine of not more than 40 shillings (at least
two months wages). The workers, with the weapon of desertion at their
disposal, paid limited heed and the legislation became almost impossible
to enforce.
In Swaziland, the difficulties of labour control in a small scale,
undercapitalised and labour-intensive industry were thus compounded by
the essentially agrarian setting in which production was taking place.
The most striking feature of the tin mines was their recurrent
difficulty with labour mobilisation and time control. Attempts by the
mining commpanies to secure a share of the Swazi migrant labour force,
and to discipline and control workers at the place of work, were
constantly undone by the nature of the labour process on the mines, the
growing domination of the Witwatersrand in the regional labour market
and the demands of the Swazi ruling class on local mineworkers. While
these relationships were under continuous assault from local settlers,
the colonial state and the corrosive effects of participation in labour
migrancy the struggles by chiefs and aristocracy to buttress their
position tended, if anything, to intensify the conflict between labour
and capital on the mines themselves. One possible solution, the use of
imported labour not subject to the same time constraints, was
theoretically quite attractive. In practice such labour was no more
reliable as the pull of the Rand drew labour inexorably from peripheral
to core mining operations.
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APPENDIX
CONTRACT SIGNED BETWEEN 50 SWAZIS AND B. ARMSTRONG AT MBABANE,
SEPTEMBER 1908
We, the undersigned members of the Ngulube, Masotha, Isaka and Magdhlela
regiments of the Swazi people, are proceeding to Johannesburg to work
underground as drill boys on the York Mine, Krugersdorp. We are going
of our own free will, at the invitation of the Ndhlovukazi, The Chief
Regent of the Swazi people and we have been dispatched "in the kraal" as
an impi. We are instructed by the Chief Regent to learn rock drilling
and to do our utmost to prove to the white people at the mines that the
Swazi nation is equal to any other nation at drill work, so that we may
win for our nation a good reputation amongst the mines and ensure
satisfactory employment and fair treatment in the future. We are proud
to be sent on a mission by the Ndhlovukazi. We are going as though we
were going to war, and we are resolved to carry out our mission. We are
proceeding to the York Mine, Krugersdorp, where we will work for a
period of six months as drill boys. We clearly understand that we are
not promised any definite wage or rate of pay. We shall be paid
according to the manner in which we acquit ourselves. If we do not do
the regulation minimum amount of work a shift, we understand that we
shall not be paid anything. What the ordinary rates of pay shall be we
are willing to wait and learn for ourselves when we get there. We are
the scouts of the nation to ascertain how the York Mine will treat us.
We ask for no promise.
Source: Rand Daily Mail, 16 October 1908.
